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Abstract
By constructing a two-country model with asymmetry in price-
setting behavior between home and foreign intermediate goods ¯rms,
vertical production and trade, and endogenous entry of three types
of ¯nal goods ¯rms, we examine the e®ects of a reduction in the cor-
porate tax rate of the home country. In particular, we focus on the
role of asymmetry in price-setting behavior between home and foreign
intermediate goods ¯rms. We show that a reduction in home corpo-
rate tax rate yields the entry of foreign multinational ¯rms, the exit of
home multinational ¯rms, the improvement in home welfare, and the
deterioration in foreign welfare. In addition, when the ratio of home
and/or foreign intermediate goods ¯rms that set their export prices in
the local currency rises, we show that the above e®ects are weakened.
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1 Introduction
The deepening of vertical structures of production and trade, which mean
vertical production linkages, and the tremendous growth in foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) that have occurred in the past several decades have changed
the structure of macroeconomic interdependence in the global economy. With
regard to the deepening of vertical structures of production and trade, Hum-
mels et al. (2001) use data from 10 OECD and four emerging economies
and ¯nd that such a structure is observed as an important feature of today's
global production and trade.1 Based on such an empirical analysis, recently,
some researches have been conducted by incorporating vertical production
linkages into the new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model pio-
neered by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) (see, e.g., Berger (2006), Huang and
Liu (2006, 2007), Shi and Xu (2007) and Dohwa (2014, 2018)). For example,
Huang and Liu (2006) examine the e®ects of home monetary expansion on
the welfare of both countries using the stochastic two-country NOEM model
with multistage production process. They show that an increase in the stage
of production and trade tends to make the home monetary expansion bene¯-
cial for the home and foreign countries. However, many researchers including
Huang and Liu (2006) examine the e®ects of various economic shocks on the
welfare of both countries in an economy without the new entry of ¯rms.2
On the other hand, some researches have also been conducted by incorpo-
rating FDI, which involves the new entry of ¯rms,3 into the NOEM model.
For example, by incorporating FDI into the stochastic two-country NOEM
model, Russ (2007) examines the relationship between the °uctuation of the
nominal exchange rate and the multinational ¯rm's decision to enter a mar-
ket. He shows that the source of such a °uctuation determines whether or not
¯rms encourage FDI. Using the stochastic two-country NOEM model with
endogenous entry by national and multinational ¯rms, Cavallari (2010) ex-
amines the roles of these ¯rms' entry in domestic and foreign markets for the
1See also Feenstra (1998) and Yi (2003). They also emphasize the same point as
Hummels et al. (2001).
2Dohwa (2018) examines the e®ects of monetary and productivity shocks on the welfare
of both countries in an economy with the new entry of ¯rms.
3A non-exhaustive list of contributions with regard to ¯rm entry includes Corsetti et
al. (2004, 2007, 2013), Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Lewis (2006), Bilbiie et al. (2007),
Bergin and Corsetti (2008), and Cavallari (2013). The models of these researchers do not
include FDI.
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international business cycle. He shows that endogenous °uctuations of these
¯rms amplify consumption and employment spillovers in the world economy.
Johdo (2015) constructs the standard NOEM model with international relo-
cation of ¯rms, and examines the e®ects of home monetary expansion on the
welfare of both countries.4 He shows that when this relocation is highly °ex-
ible, home monetary expansion can be a beggar-thy-neighbor policy in the
sense that it lowers foreign welfare. However, The models of these researchers
examine the e®ects of various economic shocks in an economy without verti-
cal trading chain.
In addition, thus far, many researches based on the NOEM model have
been extended by incorporating the factor of ¯rms' price-setting behavior into
the models of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).5
For example, by incorporating ¯rms' behavior of setting their export prices
in the local currency into the model of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), Betts and
Devereux (2000) examine the e®ects of a country's monetary expansion on
the welfare of both countries. However, because they assume that the frac-
tion of exporters who set prices in local currency of sale is symmetric across
countries, they cannot consider how the di®erence in home and foreign ¯rms'
price-setting behavior a®ects the e®ects of expansionary monetary policy on
the welfare of both countries. By incorporating ¯rms' asymmetric price-
setting behavior into the model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Michaelis
(2006) examines the e®ects of home monetary expansion on the welfare of
both countries. He ¯nds that home monetary expansion improves home and
foreign welfare only if the fraction of home exporters who set prices in local
currency of sale is somewhat at an intermediate range. By incorporating
¯rms' asymmetric price-setting behavior into the stochastic version of the
model of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) examine
the problems of optimal monetary policies. By comparing optimal mon-
etary policies in non-cooperative and cooperative equilibriums, they show
that there are gains from cooperation when the fractions of home and for-
eign exporters who set prices in local currency of sale are properly between
4In this paper, we basically regard a simple two-country version of deterministic NOEM
models including the model of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) as the standard NOEM model.
5The reason why this extension has been conducted is because the fact that many
¯rms in major developed countries other than the U.S. set their export prices in the local
currency has been discovered by many researchers (see, e.g., Marston (1990), Knetter
(1993), Parsley (1993), Athukorala and Menon (1994), ECU Institute (1995) and Gagnon
and Knetter (1995)).
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zero and unity.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the e®ects of a reduction in the
corporate (or pro¯t) tax rate of the home country on the macroeconomic
variables, including the number of ¯nal goods ¯rms, and welfare. In par-
ticular, we perform such an analysis focusing on the degree of asymmetric
price-setting behavior among home and foreign ¯rms engaged in intermedi-
ate goods trade. On the basis of above extensions of the NOEM model, we
construct the deterministic two-country NOEM model with the three factors
of asymmetry in price-setting behavior between home and foreign interme-
diate goods ¯rms, vertical production and trade, and endogenous entry of
three types of home and foreign ¯nal goods ¯rms.6 The main reasons for ex-
amining the macroeconomic e®ects of corporate tax reduction are based on
the following backdrops. To begin with, it is commonly believed that such a
tax reduction attracts foreign multinational ¯rms, which causes the creation
of new jobs, and thereby creates an economic boom. In fact, over the last
twenty years, the fact remains that OECD countries have competed with
each other to attract FDI by reducing their tax rates on corporate pro¯t
(see Devereux et al. (2008)). Next, in recent Japan, the government led
by Shinzo Abe proclaimed \Abenomics" as the economic policy for secular
stagnation. Abenomics comprises three arrows. Corporate tax reduction is
considered one of its growth strategies, which form the \third arrow" of Abe-
nomics. Against these backdrops, we examine the macroeconomic e®ects of
corporate tax reduction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the model. In Section 3, we examine the e®ects of a reduction in the corpo-
rate tax rate of the home country on the macroeconomic variables of both
6Using the two-country, °exible-price dynamic optimizing model without vertical trad-
ing chain, Johdo and Hashimoto (2005) examine the issue of ¯rm entry and exit between
the two countries. However, they examine the e®ects of a rise in the corporate tax rate of
the home country on the spatial distribution of ¯rms between the two countries, nominal
exchange rate, consumption and welfare. In addition, because they use the two-country
model without sticky price, they cannot perform such analyses focusing on the degree of
asymmetric price-setting behavior among home and foreign ¯rms. On the other hand,
using the three-country, °exible-price dynamic optimizing model without vertical trad-
ing chain, Johdo (2013) examines the e®ects of a reduction in the corporate tax rate in
each country on the international location of ¯rms, real wage rate, consumption and wel-
fare. However, because he uses the three-country model without sticky price, like Johdo
and Hashimoto (2005), he cannot also perform such analyses focusing on the degree of
asymmetric price-setting behavior among home and foreign ¯rms.
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countries. In Section 4, we examine the e®ects of a reduction in home corpo-
rate tax rate on the welfare of both countries. The ¯nal section summarizes
our ¯ndings and concludes the paper.
2 The model
2.1 De¯nitions of various prices
The world consists of two countries, one denoted as the home country
and the other as the foreign country. We denote the foreign variables with
an asterisk. Both countries have the same population size, which is normal-
ized to unity: Home households are de¯ned over a continuum of unit mass
and indexed by x 2 [0; 1], foreign households by x¤ 2 [0; 1]. Households are
immobile across countries. They consume a composite of di®erentiated ¯nal
goods available in their domestic market. Our assumption about the vertical
trade is based on that in Shi and Xu (2007), and Dohwa (2014, 2018). There
are two types of ¯rms in each country: ¯nal goods ¯rms and intermediate
goods ¯rms. Here, ¯rms of the ¯rst type operate either in the tradable or in
the non-tradable goods sector. Tradable ¯nal goods are sold in the domestic
markets ¡ they are therefore import-competing goods ¡ or exported. Non-
tradable ¯nal goods are produced by the multinational ¯rms in the trading
partner. These ¯rms produce di®erentiated ¯nal goods using a composite
of domestically produced intermediate inputs and a composite of imported
intermediate inputs. On the other hand, ¯rms of the second type, which
are broken down into either the domestic or the export ¯rms, produce dif-
ferentiated products using labor. Both ¯nal goods ¯rms and intermediate
goods ¯rms are monopolistically competitive producers. We assume that the
domestic and the export ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located
¯nal goods ¯rms continuously exist in the interval [0; nD;t] and the interval
[0; nX;t], respectively, and that the foreign multinational ¯rms in the non-
tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms continuously exist in
the interval [0; n¤MN;t], where nD;t, nX;t and n
¤
MN;t are endogenous.
7 There
7The domestic ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are
indexed by zF jD 2 [0; nD;t]. Similarly, the export ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of
home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, and the foreign multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable
goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are indexed by zF jX 2 [0; nX;t] and zF jMN 2
[0; n¤MN;t], respectively. A similar interpretation holds for z
¤
F jD 2 [0; n¤D;t], z¤F jX 2 [0; n¤X;t]
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is free entry in the ¯nal goods sector, but ¯nal goods ¯rms face ¯xed entry
costs to start production of a particular good.8 The home and foreign in-
termediate goods are the inputs required for the formulation of entry costs.9
With regard to the number of intermediate goods ¯rms in both countries, al-
though we assume that the domestic and the export ¯rms continuously exist
in the interval [0; 1
2
] and the interval [1
2
; 1], respectively,10 we assume that a
fraction ´ of the export ¯rms located in the home country and a fraction ´¤ of
the export ¯rms located in the foreign country set their export prices in the
local currency, i.e., they employ local-currency-pricing (LCP). The remain-
ing intermediate goods ¯rms in the export sector located in both countries
set their export prices in their own currency, i.e., they employ producer-
currency-pricing (PCP).11 This paper adopts a consumption index of the
Cobb-Douglas type as the aggregate consumption index (shown below), in
which case the consumption-based price indexes (CPIs) are given by:
Pt = P
±
T;tP
1¡±
N;t ; (1)
P ¤t = P
¤±
T;tP
¤1¡±
N;t ; (2)
where
PT;t =
µZ nD;t
0
ph;t(zF jD)1¡¸dzF jD +
Z n¤X;t
0
pf;t(z
¤
F jX)
1¡¸dz¤F jX
¶ 1
1¡¸
; (3)
P ¤T;t =
µZ nX;t
0
p¤h;t(zF jX)
1¡¸dzF jX +
Z n¤D;t
0
p¤f;t(z
¤
F jD)
1¡¸dz¤F jD
¶ 1
1¡¸
; (4)
and z¤F jMN 2 [0; nMN;t].
8As de¯ned above, although [0; nD;t], [0; nX;t] and [0; n¤MN;t] represent intervals for
home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, they can be also interpreted as intervals for the goods
produced by home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. A similar interpretation holds for [0; n¤D;t],
[0; n¤X;t] and [0; nMN;t].
9We assume that both a composite of the inputs produced by home intermediate goods
¯rms and a composite of the inputs produced by foreign intermediate goods ¯rms are
required as inventory in setting up a ¯nal goods ¯rm.
10The home intermediate goods ¯rms sold in the domestic and the export markets are
indexed by zIjD 2 [0; 12 ] and zIjX 2 [12 ; 1], respectively. A similar interpretation holds for
z¤IjD 2 [0; 12 ] and z¤IjX 2 [12 ; 1].
11As de¯ned above, although [0; 12 ] represents the interval for the home and foreign
intermediate goods ¯rms sold in the domestic market, [0; 12 ] also represents the interval for
the inputs produced by home and foreign intermediate goods ¯rms sold in the domestic
market. A similar interpretation holds for [12 ; 1].
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PN;t =
µZ n¤MN;t
0
ph;t(zF jMN)1¡¸dzF jMN
¶ 1
1¡¸
; (5)
P ¤N;t =
µZ nMN;t
0
p¤f;t(z
¤
F jMN)
1¡¸dz¤F jMN
¶ 1
1¡¸
: (6)
In Eqs.(1) and (2), Pt (P
¤
t ) is the CPI of the home (foreign) country, PT;t
(P ¤T;t) is the home (foreign) price index of tradable ¯nal goods, PN;t (P
¤
N;t) is
the home (foreign) price index of non-tradable ¯nal goods, and ± 2 [0; 1] is
the share of the tradable composite of di®erentiated ¯nal goods consumed by
the households. In Eqs.(3)¡(6), ph;t(zF jD) (p¤f;t(z¤F jD)) is the home (foreign)-
currency price of the goods produced by home (foreign)-located ¯nal goods
¯rm zF jD (z¤F jD), pf;t(z
¤
F jX) (p
¤
h;t(zF jX)) is the home (foreign)-currency price
of the goods produced by foreign (home)-located ¯nal goods ¯rm z¤F jX (zF jX),
ph;t(zF jMN) (p¤f;t(z
¤
F jMN)) is the home (foreign)-currency price of the goods
produced by home (foreign)-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jMN (z¤F jMN) and ¸ >
1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two di®erentiated ¯nal goods.
This paper assumes that the law of one price holds for ¯nal goods in all the
periods. Then, the following relationships are derived:
ph;t(zF jD) = ph;t(zF jMN) = "tp¤h;t(zF jX); (7)
p¤f;t(z
¤
F jD) = p
¤
f;t(z
¤
F jMN) =
1
"t
pf;t(z
¤
F jX); (8)
where "t is the nominal exchange rate, de¯ned as the home-currency price of
the foreign currency. Here, although Eqs.(7) and (8) holds, PT;t and "tP
¤
T;t
are not necessarily equal in both countries, because the number of domestic
¯rms located in the home (foreign) country is not necessarily equal to that
of export ¯rms located in the home (foreign) country. In addition, PN;t and
"tP
¤
N;t are not necessarily equal in both countries because these variables rep-
resent the price indexes of di®erent goods. These facts imply that purchasing
power parity (PPP) does not necessarily hold.
With regard to the production of ¯nal goods, this paper adopts a pro-
duction function of the Cobb-Douglas type (shown below), in which case the
unit costs to produce ¯nal goods are given by:
¤t = ~P
1
2
h;t
~P
1
2
f;t; (9)
¤¤t = ~P
¤ 1
2
h;t
~P
¤ 1
2
f;t ; (10)
8
where
~Pf;t =
µ
´¤
2
³
~PLCPf;t
´1¡¾
+
1¡ ´¤
2
³
~P PCPf;t
´1¡¾¶ 11¡¾
; (11)
~P ¤h;t =
µ
´
2
³
~P ¤LCPh;t
´1¡¾
+
1¡ ´
2
³
~P ¤PCPh;t
´1¡¾¶ 11¡¾
; (12)
and
~Ph;t =
ÃZ 1
2
0
~ph;t(zIjD)1¡¾dzIjD
! 1
1¡¾
; ~P ¤f;t =
ÃZ 1
2
0
~p¤f;t(z
¤
IjD)
1¡¾dz¤IjD
! 1
1¡¾
;
(13)
~PLCPf;t =
Ã
2
´¤
Z 1+´¤
2
1
2
~pLCPf;t (z
¤
IjX)
1¡¾dz¤IjX
! 1
1¡¾
; ~P ¤LCPh;t =
Ã
2
´
Z 1+´
2
1
2
~p¤LCPh;t (zIjX)
1¡¾dzIjX
! 1
1¡¾
;
(14)
~PPCPf;t =
Ã
2
1¡ ´¤
Z 1
1+´¤
2
~pPCPf;t (z
¤
IjX)
1¡¾dz¤IjX
! 1
1¡¾
; ~P ¤PCPh;t =
Ã
2
1¡ ´
Z 1
1+´
2
~p¤PCPh;t (zIjX)
1¡¾dzIjX
! 1
1¡¾
:
(15)
In Eqs.(9) and (10), ~Ph;t ( ~P
¤
h;t) is the home (foreign) price index that cor-
responds to a composite of the inputs produced by domestic (export) ¯rms
in the home intermediate goods sector, ~Pf;t ( ~P
¤
f;t) is the home (foreign) price
index that corresponds to a composite of the inputs produced by export
(domestic) ¯rms in the foreign intermediate goods sector. The import price
indexes of home- and foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are given in Eqs.(11)
and (12), where ~P PCPf;t (
~PLCPf;t ) is the home price index that corresponds to a
composite of the inputs produced by PCP (LCP) export ¯rms in the foreign
intermediate goods sector, and ~P ¤PCPh;t ( ~P
¤LCP
h;t ) is the foreign price index that
corresponds to a composite of the inputs produced by PCP (LCP) export
¯rms in the home intermediate goods sector. In Eqs.(13)¡(15), ~ph;t(zIjD)
(~p¤f;t(z
¤
IjD)) is the home (foreign)-currency price of the input produced by
domestic ¯rm zIjD (z¤IjD) in the home (foreign) intermediate goods sector,
~pPCPf;t (z
¤
IjX) (~p
LCP
f;t (z
¤
IjX)) is the home-currency price of the input produced
by PCP (LCP) export ¯rm z¤IjX in the foreign intermediate goods sector,
~p¤PCPh;t (zIjX) (~p
¤LCP
h;t (zIjX)) is the foreign-currency price of the input produced
by PCP (LCP) export ¯rm zIjX in the home intermediate goods sector, and
¾ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two di®erentiated inter-
mediate inputs.
9
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final goods ¯rms
Each of the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms uses home and foreign in-
termediate goods to produce output according to the following production
function:
Yt(zF jj) = 2Yh;t(zF jj)
1
2Yf;t(zF jj)
1
2 ; j = D;X;MN (16)
where
Yh;t(zF jj) =
ÃZ 1
2
0
Yh;t(zF jj; zIjD)
¾¡1
¾ dzIjD
! ¾
¾¡1
; (17)
Yf;t(zF jj) =
ÃZ 1+´¤
2
1
2
Y LCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX)
¾¡1
¾ dz¤IjX +
Z 1
1+´¤
2
Y PCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX)
¾¡1
¾ dz¤IjX
! ¾
¾¡1
:
(18)
In Eq.(16), Yt(zF jj) is the output produced by home-located ¯nal goods
¯rm zF jj and Yh;t(zF jj) (Yf;t(zF jj)) is a composite of the home (foreign) in-
termediate inputs used by home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj. Yh;t(zF jj) and
Yf;t(zF jj) are given in Eqs.(17) and (18), where Yh;t(zF jj; zIjD) is the home
intermediate input zIjD used by home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj, and
Y PCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX) (Y
LCP
f;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX)) is the foreign PCP (LCP) intermediate
input z¤IjX used by home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj. Here, the home-located
¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj's expenditure for the sum of Yh;t(zF jj) and Yf;t(zF jj) is
represented as follows:
¤tYt(zF jj) = ~Ph;tYh;t(zF jj) + ~Pf;tYf;t(zF jj): (19)
Subject to Eq.(16), the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj minimizes
Eq.(19). Then, the demands of the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj for
Yh;t(zF jj) and Yf;t(zF jj) are derived as follows:
Yh;t(zF jj) =
1
2
Ã
~Ph;t
¤t
!¡1
Yt(zF jj); (20)
Yf;t(zF jj) =
1
2
Ã
~Pf;t
¤t
!¡1
Yt(zF jj): (21)
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Next, we consider the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj's demand for the
input produced by home intermediate goods ¯rm zIjD. Here, a composite
of the inputs produced by home intermediate goods ¯rms that exist contin-
uously in the interval [0,1
2
] is given by Eq.(17), and the home-located ¯nal
goods ¯rm zF jj's nominal expenditure for the inputs produced by these ¯rms
is formulated as ~Ph;tYh;t(zF jj) =
R 1
2
0
~ph;t(zIjD)Yh;t(zF jj; zIjD)dzIjD. Subject to
Eq.(17), the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj determines Yh;t(zF jj; zIjD) in
order to minimize this expenditure. Then, the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm
zF jj's demand for the input produced by home intermediate goods ¯rm zIjD
is derived as follows:
Yh;t(zF jj; zIjD) =
Ã
~ph;t(zIjD)
~Ph;t
!¡¾
Yh;t(zF jj): (22)
Similarly, the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj's demands for the inputs
produced by foreign PCP intermediate goods ¯rm z¤IjX and foreign LCP
intermediate goods ¯rm z¤IjX can be calculated as follows:
Y PCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX) =
Ã
~pPCPf;t (z
¤
IjX)
~P PCPf;t
!¡¾Ã ~P PCPf;t
~Pf;t
!¡¾
Yf;t(zF jj); (23)
Y LCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX) =
Ã
~pLCPf;t (z
¤
IjX)
~PLCPf;t
!¡¾Ã ~PLCPf;t
~Pf;t
!¡¾
Yf;t(zF jj): (24)
Combining Eqs.(20) and (22), the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj's
demand for the input produced by home intermediate goods ¯rm zIjD is
derived in the following exact form:
Yh;t(zF jj; zIjD) =
1
2
Ã
~ph;t(zIjD)
~Ph;t
!¡¾Ã
~Ph;t
¤t
!¡1
Yt(zF jj): (25)
Similarly, the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj's demands for the inputs
produced by foreign PCP intermediate goods ¯rm z¤IjX and foreign LCP
intermediate goods ¯rm z¤IjX are derived in the exact form as follows:
Y PCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX) =
1
2
Ã
~pPCPf;t (z
¤
IjX)
~P PCPf;t
!¡¾Ã ~P PCPf;t
~Pf;t
!¡¾Ã
~Pf;t
¤t
!¡1
Yt(zF jj);
(26)
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Y LCPf;t (zF jj; z
¤
IjX) =
1
2
Ã
~pLCPf;t (z
¤
IjX)
~PLCPf;t
!¡¾Ã ~PLCPf;t
~Pf;t
!¡¾Ã
~Pf;t
¤t
!¡1
Yt(zF jj):
(27)
Here, the resource constraint for goods produced by the home-located
¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj is represented as follows:
Yt(zF jj) ¸
Z 1
0
Ch;t(zF jj; x)dx; (28)
where Ch;t(zF jj; x) is the home household x's consumption of goods produced
by the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj. Using Eq.(28), the home-located
¯nal goods ¯rm zF jj's pro¯t is represented as follows:
¦F;t(zF jj) = (ph;t(zF jj)¡ ¤t)Yt(zF jj): (29)
To start production, each of the ¯nal goods ¯rms must pay a ¯xed cost.
We assume that the entry cost for each class of ¯nal goods ¯rms is represented
in the following form:
qt(zF jj) =
³
~Ph;t + ~Pf;t
´
n°j;t; (30)
qt(zF jMN) =
³
~Ph;t + ~Pf;t
´
n¤°MN;t; (31)
q¤t (z
¤
F jj) =
³
~P ¤h;t + ~P
¤
f;t
´
n¤°j;t; (32)
q¤t (z
¤
F jMN) =
³
~P ¤h;t + ~P
¤
f;t
´
n°MN;t; (33)
where j = (D;X) and ° > 0 is a measure of the concavity of the cost
function. For example, Eq.(30) shows that each of the ¯rms that belongs to
the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms requires both n°j;t
units of the composite of home intermediate inputs and n°j;t units of that of
foreign intermediate inputs to create a new ¯nal good. Given Eqs.(30)¡(33),
the resource constraints in home and foreign intermediate inputs used by
home and foreign ¯nal goods ¯rms are represented as follows:
Yh;t ¸ 1
2
Ã
~Ph;t
¤t
!¡1Ã X
j=D;X
Z nj;t
0
Yt(zF jj)dzF jj +
Z n¤MN;t
0
Yt(zF jMN)dzF jMN
!
12
+Ã X
j=D;X
n1+°j;t + n
¤1+°
MN;t
!
; (34)
Yf;t ¸ 1
2
Ã
~Pf;t
¤t
!¡1Ã X
j=D;X
Z nj;t
0
Yt(zF jj)dzF jj +
Z n¤MN;t
0
Yt(zF jMN)dzF jMN
!
+
Ã X
j=D;X
n1+°j;t + n
¤1+°
MN;t
!
; (35)
Y ¤h;t ¸
1
2
Ã
~P ¤h;t
¤¤t
!¡1Ã X
j=D;X
Z n¤j;t
0
Y ¤t (z
¤
F jj)dz
¤
F jj +
Z nMN;t
0
Y ¤t (z
¤
F jMN)dz
¤
F jMN
!
+
Ã X
j=D;X
n¤1+°j;t + n
1+°
MN;t
!
; (36)
Y ¤f;t ¸
1
2
Ã
~P ¤f;t
¤¤t
!¡1Ã X
j=D;X
Z n¤j;t
0
Y ¤t (z
¤
F jj)dz
¤
F jj +
Z nMN;t
0
Y ¤t (z
¤
F jMN)dz
¤
F jMN
!
+
Ã X
j=D;X
n¤1+°j;t + n
1+°
MN;t
!
: (37)
2.2.2 Intermediate goods ¯rms
As shown in more detail below, the three types of home intermediate
goods ¯rms produce a di®erentiated good using a continuum of labor inputs
provided by the home households:
Yh;t(zIjD) =
µZ 1
0
`t(zIjD; x)
»¡1
» dx
¶ »
»¡1
; (38)
Y ¤PCPh;t (zIjX) =
µZ 1
0
`t(zIjX ; x)
»¡1
» dx
¶ »
»¡1
; (39)
Y ¤LCPh;t (zIjX) =
µZ 1
0
`t(zIjX ; x)
»¡1
» dx
¶ »
»¡1
; (40)
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where Yh;t(zIjD) is the output of goods produced by home intermediate goods
¯rm zIjD toward three types of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, Y ¤PCPh;t (zIjX)
(Y ¤LCPh;t (zIjX)) is the output of goods produced by home PCP (LCP) interme-
diate goods ¯rm zIjX toward three types of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms,
`t(zIjD; x) (`t(zIjX ; x)) is the labor of home household x employed by home
intermediate goods ¯rm zIjD (zIjX), and » > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among labor varieties. First, the pro¯t of a home intermediate goods ¯rm
zIjD is represented as follows:
¦I;t(zIjD) = (~ph;t(zIjD)¡Wt)Yh;t(zIjD); (41)
where Wt is the aggregate wage index (shown below). Assuming that nom-
inal wages are °exible, given the demand function expressed in Eq.(22), the
optimal price is determined as follows:
~ph;t(zIjD) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1Wt ´ ~ph;t: (42)
Eq.(42) shows that the home intermediate goods ¯rm zIjD sets its good's
price at the marginal cost (Wt) multiplied by the mark-up ratio (¾=(¾ ¡ 1)).
Next, the pro¯ts of a home PCP intermediate goods ¯rm zIjX and a home
LCP intermediate goods ¯rm zIjX are represented as follows:
¦PCPI;t (zIjX) = (~p
PCP
h;t (zIjX)¡Wt)Y ¤PCPh;t (zIjX); (43)
¦LCPI;t (zIjX) = ("t~p
¤LCP
h;t (zIjX)¡Wt)Y ¤LCPh;t (zIjX): (44)
As per the process of analysis adopted for the pro¯t-maximization problem
of a home intermediate goods ¯rm zIjD, the sales prices of these ¯rms can be
expressed in the following equation, when nominal wages are °exible:
~pPCPh;t (zIjX) = "t~p
¤LCP
h;t (zIjX) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1Wt ´ ~ph;t: (45)
Eq.(45) shows that the sales price of the PCP intermediate goods ¯rm zIjX
is equal to that of the LCP intermediate goods ¯rm zIjX . Therefore, even if
intermediate goods ¯rms set their export prices in di®erent currencies, the
law of one price holds for every intermediate good under °exible wages.
On the other hand, as we mention in Section 3, our model takes into
account nominal wage rigidity in the short run. Under sticky wages, the
law of one price does not hold for the inputs produced by LCP interme-
diate goods ¯rms. This is because LCP intermediate goods ¯rms do not
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pass on the exchange rate changes to export prices denominated in the local
currency. Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, as shown in Corsetti and Pe-
senti (2005), the prices of the intermediate inputs sold in the export market,
taking into account the incomplete pass through of the nominal exchange
rate, are as follows:
~P ¤h;t =
~^Ph;t
"1¡´t
; (46)
~Pf;t = "
1¡´¤
t
~^P ¤f;t; (47)
where ~^Ph;t
³
~^P ¤f;t
´
is the predetermined component of the foreign (home)-
currency price that corresponds to a composite of the inputs produced by
home (foreign) export ¯rms in the intermediate goods sector.
2.3 Households and government
We de¯ne the utility function for the home household x as follows:
Ut(x) =
1X
s=t
¯s¡t
µ
lnCs(x) + Âln
Ms(x)
Ps
¡ ·`s(x)
¶
; (48)
where ¯ 2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, C(x) is the aggregate
consumption index of the home household x, M(x) is the home household
x's holdings of the home country's currency, `(x) is the home household x's
labor service, and the other Greek letters are positive parameters. This utility
function implies that the home household x gains utility by consuming ¯nal
goods and holding real money, and su®ers disutility by supplying labor. As
we mentioned before, the aggregate consumption index of home household x
is given by:
Ct(x) =
C±T;t(x)C
1¡±
N;t (x)
±±(1¡ ±)1¡± ; (49)
where CT;t(x) and CN;t(x) are tradable and non-tradable composites of di®er-
entiated ¯nal goods consumed by the home household x, respectively. These
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variables are given by:12
CT;t(x) =
ÃZ nD;t
0
Ch;t(zF jD; x)
¸¡1
¸ dzF jD +
Z n¤X;t
0
Cf;t(z
¤
F jX ; x)
¸¡1
¸ dz¤F jX
! ¸
¸¡1
;
(50)
CN;t(x) =
µZ n¤MN;t
0
Ch;t(zF jMN ; x)
¸¡1
¸ dzF jMN
¶ ¸
¸¡1
; (51)
where Ch;t(zF jD; x) is the consumption of the home ¯nal good zF jD by home
household x, Ch;t(z
¤
F jX ; x) is the consumption of the foreign ¯nal good z
¤
F jX
by home household x, and Ch;t(zF jMN ; x) is the consumption of the home
¯nal good zF jMN by home household x.
The home household x maximizes utility subject to the following budget
constraint:
"tBt+1(x)
Pt
+
Mt(x)
Pt
+ Ct(x) +
It(x)
Pt
=
"t(1 + i
¤
t )Bt(x)
Pt
+
Mt¡1(x)
Pt
+
wt(x)`t(x)
Pt
+
Tt(x)
Pt
+
¦F;t(x)
Pt
+
¦I;t(x)
Pt
; (52)
where Bt(x) is the stock of foreign currency denominated bonds that the
home household x holds at the beginning of period t, It(x) is the home
household x's `investment' in ¯nal goods ¯rms (¯nancing entry costs), i¤t is
the nominal interest rate between periods t ¡ 1 and t evaluated in foreign
currency terms, wt(x) is the nominal wage, which corresponds to `t(x), Tt(x)
are lump-sum transfers from the home government, and ¦F;t(x) and ¦I;t(x)
are dividend revenues from the ¯nal and intermediate goods ¯rms that the
home household x owns, respectively.
As mentioned in Corsetti et al. (2004, 2013), we assume that households
are endowed with a well-diversi¯ed international portfolio of claims on ¯nal
goods ¯rms' after-tax pro¯ts, so that they ¯nance the same fraction of the
cost of creating new ¯nal goods in each country. Then, the investment of the
home household x in a diversi¯ed portfolio of ¯nal goods ¯rms is de¯ned as
follows:
It(x) =
1
2
Ã X
j=D;X
Z nj;t
0
qt(zF jj)dzF jj +
Z n¤MN;t
0
qt(zF jMN)dzF jMN
12CT;t(x) and CN;t(x) are consumption indexes of the Dixit and Stigliz (1977) type.
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+"t
Ã X
j=D;X
Z n¤j;t
0
q¤t (z
¤
F jj)dz
¤
F jj +
Z nMN;t
0
q¤t (z
¤
F jMN)dz
¤
F jMN
!!
: (53)
We assume that, in return, each of the home households receives an equal
share of the after-tax pro¯ts of all ¯nal goods ¯rms located in the home and
foreign countries:
¦F;t(x) =
1
2
Ã
(1¡¿t)
Ã X
j=D;X
Z nj;t
0
¦F;t(zF jj)dzF jj +
Z n¤MN;t
0
¦F;t(zF jMN)dzF jMN
!
+"t
Ã X
j=D;X
Z n¤j;t
0
¦¤F;t(z
¤
F jj)dz
¤
F jj +
Z nMN;t
0
¦¤F;t(z
¤
F jMN)dz
¤
F jMN
!!
; (54)
where ¿t is the corporate (or pro¯t) tax rate of the home country.
In addition, the household is a monopoly supplier of a di®erentiated labor
service and faces the following labor-demand curve:
`t(x) =
µ
wt(x)
Wt
¶¡»ÃZ 1
2
0
Yh;t(zIjD)dzIjD+
Z 1+´
2
1
2
Y ¤LCPh;t (zIjX)dzIjX+
Z 1
1+´
2
Y ¤PCPh;t (zIjX)dzIjX
!
;
(55)
where Wt =
³R 1
0
wt(x)
1¡»dx
´ 1
1¡»
is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution
(CES) wage index.
Before turning to the intertemporal maximization problem, we consider
the optimal consumption demands for Ch;t(zF jD; x), Cf;t(zF jX ; x) and Ch;t(zF jMN ; x).
To begin with, the home household x's expenditure for the sum of CT;t(x)
and CN;t(x) is represented as follows:
PtCt(x) = PT;tCT;t(x) + PN;tCN;t(x): (56)
Subject to Eq.(56), the home household x maximizes Eq.(49). Then, the
demands of the home household x for CT;t(x) and CN;t(x) are derived as
follows:
CT;t(x) = ±
µ
PT;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct(x); (57)
CN;t(x) = (1¡ ±)
µ
PN;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct(x): (58)
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Next, we consider the home household x's demands for the goods pro-
duced by domestic ¯rm zF jD that belongs to the tradable goods sector of
home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms and export ¯rm z¤F jX that belongs to the trad-
able goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. Here, CT;t(x) is given
by Eq.(50), and the nominal consumption expenditure, which corresponds
to CT;t(x), is de¯ned as PT;tCT;t(x) ´
R nD;t
0
ph;t(zF jD)Ch;t(zF jD; x)dzF jD +R n¤X;t
0 pf;t(z
¤
F jX)Cf;t(z
¤
F jX ; x)dz
¤
F jX . Subject to this de¯nition, the agent deter-
mines Ch;t(zF jD; x) and Cf;t(z¤F jX ; x) in order to maximize Eq.(50). Then, the
optimal consumption demands for Ch;t(zF jD; x) and Cf;t(z¤F jX ; x) are derived
as follows:
Ch;t(zF jD; x) =
µ
ph;t(zF jD)
PT;t
¶¡¸
CT;t(x); (59)
Cf;t(z
¤
F jX ; x) =
Ã
pf;t(z
¤
F jX)
PT;t
!¡¸
CT;t(x): (60)
Similarly, the optimal consumption demand for Ch;t(zF jMN ; x) can be
calculated as follows:
Ch;t(zF jMN ; x) =
µ
ph;t(zF jMN)
PN;t
¶¡¸
CN;t(x): (61)
From Eqs.(57), (59) and (60), the optimal consumption demands for
Ch;t(zF jD; x) and Cf;t(z¤F jX ; x) are derived in the following exact form:
Ch;t(zF jD; x) = ±
µ
ph;t(zF jD)
PT;t
¶¡¸µ
PT;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct(x); (62)
Cf;t(z
¤
F jX ; x) = ±
Ã
pf;t(z
¤
F jX)
PT;t
!¡¸µ
PT;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct(x): (63)
Similarly, the optimal consumption demand for Ch;t(zF jMN ; x) is derived
in the exact form as follows:
Ch;t(zF jMN ; x) = (1¡ ±)
µ
ph;t(zF jMN)
PN;t
¶¡¸µ
PN;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct(x): (64)
We now turn to the intertemporal maximization problem. Subject to
Eq.(52), the home household x maximizes Eq.(48). Then, the ¯rst-order
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necessary conditions for Ct(x), Mt(x) and `t(x) are derived as follows:
Ct+1(x)
Ct(x)
= ¯(1 + i¤t+1)
Pt="t
Pt+1="t+1
; (65)
Mt(x)
Pt
= Â
(1 + i¤t+1)"t+1
(1 + i¤t+1)"t+1 ¡ "t
Ct(x); (66)
wt(x)
Pt
=
»·
» ¡ 1Ct(x): (67)
Eq.(65) is the Euler equation, Eq.(66) is the real money demand function,
and Eq.(67) shows that the real wage rate is equal to a constant markup over
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
From now, we denote the ¯rst-order necessary conditions for the home
households as a whole. For example, we de¯ne the average consumption
of home households in period t as the integral of Ct(x) over all x. We de-
note such a variable as Ct. We also de¯ne Mt and Bt in analogous ways
for money holdings and bond holdings, respectively. Then, by focusing on
symmetric equilibrium, where all home households are identical within the
home country, we can derive the following relationships for all t:
Ct = Ct(x); Mt =Mt(x); Bt = Bt(x): (68)
Considering Eqs.(65)¡(68) and assuming a symmetric equilibrium, the
¯rst-order necessary conditions for Ct(x), Mt(x) and `t(x) are corrected as
follows, respectively:
Ct+1
Ct
= ¯(1 + i¤t+1)
Pt="t
Pt+1="t+1
; (69)
Mt
Pt
= Â
(1 + i¤t+1)"t+1
(1 + i¤t+1)"t+1 ¡ "t
Ct; (70)
Wt
Pt
=
»·
» ¡ 1Ct: (71)
Under the assumption that all revenues from both corporate taxes and
money creation are distributed across households in a lump-sum fashion, the
budget constraint for the home government can be represented as follows:
Mt ¡Mt¡1 + ¿t
Ã X
j=D;X
Z nj;t
0
¦F;t(zF jj)dzF jj +
Z n¤MN;t
0
¦F;t(zF jMN)dzF jMN
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+Z 1
2
0
¦I;t(zIjD)dzIjD +
Z 1
1
2
¦I;t(zIjX)dzIjX
!
= Tt: (72)
Although our analytical purpose is to examine the e®ects of an unantici-
pated permanent reduction in the corporate tax rate of the home country, in
our model, it is analytically convenient to introduce a measure of monetary
stance ¹t ´ PtCt.13 Using this measure, we can rewrite Eqs.(69) and (70) as
follows:
1
¹t
= ¯(1 + i¤t+1)
"t+1
"t
1
¹t+1
; (73)
Mt = Â
(1 + i¤t+1)"t+1
(1 + i¤t+1)"t+1 ¡ "t
¹t: (74)
Foreign households have the same preferences as home households. Thus,
the foreign household x¤'s lifetime utility function and its budget constraint
are shown as follows:
U¤t (x
¤) =
1X
s=t
¯s¡t
µ
lnC¤s (x
¤) + Âln
M¤s (x
¤)
P ¤s
¡ ·`¤s(x¤)
¶
; (75)
B¤t+1(x
¤)
P ¤t
+
M¤t (x
¤)
P ¤t
+ C¤t (x
¤) +
I¤t (x
¤)
P ¤t
=
(1 + i¤t )B
¤
t (x
¤)
P ¤t
+
M¤t¡1(x
¤)
P ¤t
+
w¤t (x
¤)`¤t (x
¤)
P ¤t
+
T ¤t (x
¤)
P ¤t
+
¦¤F;t(x
¤)
P ¤t
+
¦¤I;t(x
¤)
P ¤t
; (76)
where ¯, Â and · are the same as in the home country.
Now, we represent the equilibrium condition for the asset market. The
worldwide net supply of bonds has to be equal to zero. Therefore, the equi-
librium condition for the asset market is represented as follows:14
Bt +B
¤
t = 0: (77)
13Our de¯nition of the variables of monetary policy is based on that in Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005), and Corsetti and Dedola (2005). This de¯nition implies that the govern-
ment controls nominal consumption. In addition, as mentioned in footnotes 15 and 16, we
use the relationship of Bt+1 = Bt = 0. Therefore, a temporary home monetary easing at
period t, associated with a higher ¹t, leads to a lower it+1 (see Eq.(A) in footnote 14).
14We de¯ne it as the nominal interest rate between periods t ¡ 1 and t evaluated in
home currency terms. Although we do not describe it in the text, uncovered interest rate
parity (UIP), i.e., 1 + it = (1 + i¤t )("t="t¡1), holds between it and i
¤
t , since there is free
trade between the countries in nominal bonds. From here onwards Eqs.(73) and (74) can
be rewritten as follows, respectively:
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2.4 Final goods prices, price indexes of ¯nal goods and
CPIs
From Eqs.(62)¡(64), the aggregate home consumption demands for goods
produced by the domestic ¯rm zF jD, which belongs to the tradable goods
sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, the export ¯rm z¤F jX , which belongs
to the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms and the
foreign multinational ¯rm zF jMN , which belongs to the non-tradable goods
sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are represented as follows:Z 1
0
Ch;t(zF jD; x)dx ´ Ch;t(zF jD) = ±
µ
ph;t(zF jD)
PT;t
¶¡¸µ
PT;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct; (78)
Z 1
0
Cf;t(z
¤
F jX ; x)dx ´ Cf;t(z¤F jX) = ±
Ã
pf;t(z
¤
F jX)
PT;t
!¡¸µ
PT;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct; (79)
Z 1
0
Ch;t(zF jMN ; x)dx ´ Ch;t(zF jMN) = (1¡±)
µ
ph;t(zF jMN)
PN;t
¶¡¸µ
PN;t
Pt
¶¡1
Ct:
(80)
Using Eqs.(28), (29) and (78), we can easily derive the optimal price
charged by domestic ¯rm zF jD, which belongs to the tradable goods sector
of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms as follows:
ph;t(zF jD) =
¸
¸¡ 1¤t ´ ph;t: (81)
Similarly, we can also derive the optimal prices charged by export ¯rm
z¤F jX , which belongs to the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal
goods ¯rms, and foreign multinational ¯rm zF jMN , which belongs to the
non-tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms as follows:
pf;t(z
¤
F jX)
"t
=
¸
¸¡ 1¤
¤
t ´ p¤f;t; (82)
1
¹t
= ¯(1 + it+1)
1
¹t+1
; (A)
Mt = Â
1 + it+1
it+1
¹t: (B)
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ph;t(zF jMN) =
¸
¸¡ 1¤t ´ ph;t: (83)
With regard to the ¯nal goods ¯rms sold in the foreign market, we can
derive the optimal prices of these ¯rms as follows:
p¤f;t(z
¤
F jD) =
¸
¸¡ 1¤
¤
t ´ p¤f;t; (84)
"tp
¤
h;t(zF jX) =
¸
¸¡ 1¤t ´ ph;t; (85)
p¤f;t(z
¤
F jMN) =
¸
¸¡ 1¤
¤
t ´ p¤f;t: (86)
Here, using Eqs.(13), (42) and (45)¡(47), the unit costs to produce home
and foreign ¯nal goods, which are given in Eqs.(9) and (10), can be repre-
sented as follows:
¤t = 2
1
¾¡1
¾
¾ ¡ 1"
1¡´¤
2
t Wt; (87)
¤¤t = 2
1
¾¡1
¾
¾ ¡ 1"
´¡1
2
t W
¤
t : (88)
Therefore, from Eqs.(81)¡(88), ph;t and p¤f;t can be rewritten as follows:
ph;t = 2
1
¾¡1
¸
¸¡ 1
¾
¾ ¡ 1"
1¡´¤
2
t Wt; (89)
p¤f;t = 2
1
¾¡1
¸
¸¡ 1
¾
¾ ¡ 1"
´¡1
2
t W
¤
t : (90)
With regard to the price indexes for tradable and non-tradable composites
of di®erentiated ¯nal goods consumed by the households of both countries,
from Eqs.(81)¡(86), they are equal to:
PT;t = ph;tA
1
1¡¸
t ; (91)
P ¤T;t = p
¤
f;tA
¤ 1
1¡¸
t ; (92)
PN;t = ph;tn
¤ 1
1¡¸
MN;t; (93)
P ¤N;t = p
¤
f;tn
1
1¡¸
MN;t; (94)
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where
At ´ nD;t + n¤X;t
¡
"tp
¤
f;t=ph;t
¢1¡¸
; (95)
A¤t ´ n¤D;t + nX;t
¡
"tp
¤
f;t=ph;t
¢¸¡1
: (96)
From Eqs.(91)¡(94), the CPIs of both countries are equal to:
Pt = ph;tn
¤ 1¡±
1¡¸
MN;tA
±
1¡¸
t ; (97)
P ¤t = p
¤
f;tn
1¡±
1¡¸
MN;tA
¤ ±
1¡¸
t : (98)
2.5 Free entry and the balance of payments
In this subsection, we mainly represent the conditions that hold under a
situation of free entry and the balance of payments of the home country. To
begin with, using Eqs.(28), (29), (81), (83) and (85), we can represent the
after-tax pro¯ts earned by the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms as follows:
(1¡ ¿t)¦F;t(zF jD) = ± (1¡ ¿t)¹t
¸
µ
nD;t + n¤X;t"
(´+´¤)(1¡¸)
2
t
¶ ; (99)
(1¡ ¿t)¦F;t(zF jX) = ± (1¡ ¿t)¹
¤
t "
(´+´¤)(¸¡1)+2
2
t
¸
µ
n¤D;t + nX;t"
(´+´¤)(¸¡1)
2
t
¶ ; (100)
(1¡ ¿t)¦F;t(zF jMN) = (1¡ ±)(1¡ ¿t)¹t
¸n¤MN;t
: (101)
Similarly, we can represent the pro¯ts earned by the foreign-located ¯nal
goods ¯rms as follows:
¦¤F;t(z
¤
F jD) = ±
¹¤t
¸
µ
n¤D;t + nX;t"
(´+´¤)(¸¡1)
2
t
¶ ; (102)
¦¤F;t(z
¤
F jX) = ±
µ
¹t"
(´+´¤)(1¡¸)¡2
2
t
¶
¸
µ
nD;t + n¤X;t"
(´+´¤)(1¡¸)
2
t
¶ ; (103)
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¦¤F;t(z
¤
F jMN) = (1¡ ±)
¹¤t
¸nMN;t
: (104)
Other things being equal, Eqs.(99)¡(104) show that a higher number of
¯nal goods ¯rms in a sector reduces the after-tax pro¯ts of each ¯nal goods
¯rm in that sector.
With free entry, optimal investment in new ¯nal goods of the home country
implies that the value of a home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm is equal to the cost
of creating a home ¯nal good, and in equilibrium this must be equal to the
value of the after-tax pro¯ts of a home-located ¯nal goods ¯rm. Therefore,
the following relationships are derived:
qt(zF jD) = ( ~Ph;t + ~Pf;t)n
°
D;t = (1¡ ¿t)¦F;t(zF jD); (105)
qt(zF jX) = ( ~Ph;t + ~Pf;t)n
°
X;t = (1¡ ¿t)¦F;t(zF jX); (106)
q¤t (z
¤
F jMN) = ( ~Ph;t + ~Pf;t)n
¤°
MN;t = (1¡ ¿t)¦F;t(zF jMN): (107)
We de¯ne these relationships as the free entry conditions of the home
country. Similarly, we can represent the free entry conditions of the foreign
country as follows:
q¤t (z
¤
F jD) = ( ~P
¤
h;t + ~P
¤
f;t)n
¤°
D;t = ¦
¤
F;t(z
¤
F jD); (108)
q¤t (z
¤
F jX) = ( ~P
¤
h;t + ~P
¤
f;t)n
¤°
X;t = ¦
¤
F;t(z
¤
F jX); (109)
qt(zF jMN) = ( ~P ¤h;t + ~P
¤
f;t)n
°
MN;t = ¦
¤
F;t(z
¤
F jMN): (110)
Next, aggregating the households' budget constraints in the home country,
and using the government budget constraint and the relationship of Bt+1 =
Bt = 0, we can represent the balance of payments of the home country as
follows:15
±
0B@nX;t("t¹¤t )
³
"tp¤f;t
ph;t
´¸¡1
A¤t
¡
n¤X;t¹t
³
"tp¤f;t
ph;t
´1¡¸
At
1CA
¡(1¡ ¿t)
2
Ã X
j=D;X
nj;t¦F;t(zF jj) + n¤MN;t¦F;t(zF jMN)
!
15With regard to the relationship of Bt+1 = Bt = 0, refer to the content in footnote 16.
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= 0: (111)
On the left-hand side of Eq.(111), the ¯rst term of the ¯rst line represents
home exports, while the second term of this line represents home imports.
Therefore, their di®erence is the trade balance. The second line represents
net after-tax pro¯ts paid by home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms to foreign house-
holds, and the third line represents net pro¯ts paid by foreign-located ¯nal
goods ¯rms to home households. Therefore, their di®erence is the net fac-
tor payments. The sum of the trade balance and the net factor payments
constitutes the current account. The sum of the last two lines represents
the ¯nancial account, i.e., the ¯nancing of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms by
foreign households minus the ¯nancing of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms
by home households.
3 The transmission mechanism in an econ-
omy without trade in international bonds
In this section, we examine the e®ects of an unanticipated temporary
reduction in the corporate tax rate of the home country.16 We distinguish
between three periods. In the initial period, the economy is in a symmetric
steady state where no country has any net claims on the other. In period t, a
negative home corporate tax shock occurs and we observe a short-run equi-
librium, which assumes that nominal wages are ¯xed, before this shock can
be observed. In the long run (from period t+ 1 onward), nominal wages are
adjusted, and all variables reach their new steady-state values. To represent
variables in the initial steady-state, we hereafter represent these variables
16In this paper, we focus on the analytical investigation as much as possible. Therefore,
we examine the e®ects of a reduction in the corporate tax rate of the home country by
ruling out trade in international bonds.
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without a time subscript. Although we distinguish between three periods,
all real variables in the long run return to their pre-shock levels, since we
assume the absence of current account imbalances. Therefore, we examine
only the short-run e®ects of this shock.
3.1 The initial steady state
In this subsection, we illustrate closed form solutions derived in the initial
steady state with ¿ = 0, B = B¤ = 0 and ¹ = ¹¤ = 1.17
To begin with, from Eq.(71) and its foreign analog, we derive:
W =W ¤ =
»·
» ¡ 1 : (112)
Next, from the two conditions of PC = P ¤C¤ and PTCT = "P ¤TC
¤
T , we
derive:
" = 1: (113)
Further, from Eqs.(112) and (113), and the relationships of ~p¤h(zIjX) =
~^ph(zIjX)=", ~pf (z¤IjX) = " ~^p
¤
f (z
¤
IjX), ~ph(zIjD) =
¾
¾¡1W , ~p
¤
f (z
¤
IjD) =
¾
¾¡1W
¤,
~^ph(zIjX) = ~ph(zIjD) and ~^p¤f (z
¤
IjX) = ~p
¤
f (z
¤
IjD), we derive:
18
~ph(zIjD) = ~p¤h(zIjX) = ~p
¤
f (z
¤
IjD) = ~pf (z
¤
IjX) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1
»·
» ¡ 1 : (114)
Moreover, from Eqs.(9), (10), (13), (46), (47), and (114), we derive:
¤ = ¤¤ = 2
1
¾¡1
¾
¾ ¡ 1
»·
» ¡ 1 : (115)
Therefore, from Eqs.(81)¡(86), (113) and (115), we derive:
ph(zF jD) = p¤h(zF jX) = ph(zF jMN) = p
¤
f (z
¤
F jD) = pf (z
¤
F jX)
= p¤f (z
¤
F jMN) = 2
1
¾¡1
¸
¸¡ 1
¾
¾ ¡ 1
»·
» ¡ 1 : (116)
17We assume that the initial steady-state levels of home and foreign money supply are:
M = M¤ = Â(1¡ ¯)¡1.
18 ~^ph(zIjX)
³
~^p¤f (z
¤
IjX)
´
is the predetermined component of the foreign (home)-currency
price of input produced by each of home (foreign) export ¯rms in the intermediate goods
sector.
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Here, from Eqs.(95), (96), (105)¡(111), (113), (116) and the condition of
PT = "P
¤
T , we derive:
nD = nX = n
¤
D = n
¤
X : (117)
Therefore, from Eqs.(13), (47), (99), (105), (113), (114) and (117), we
derive:
nD(= nX = n
¤
D = n
¤
X) =
µ
±
2
2¾¡1
¾¡1 ¸
¾ ¡ 1
¾
» ¡ 1
»·
¶
: (118)
Similarly, from Eqs.(13), (46), (47), (107), (110), (113) and (114), we
derive the number of foreign (home) multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable
goods sector of home (foreign)-located ¯nal goods ¯rms as follows:
n¤MN(= nMN) =
µ
1¡ ±
2
¾
¾¡1¸
¾ ¡ 1
¾
» ¡ 1
»·
¶ 1
1+°
: (119)
Finally, from Eqs.(13), (20), (21), (46), (47), (55), (105)¡(110), (115)¡(117),
(119), ¦F (zF jj) =
phY (zF jj)
¸
and their foreign analogs, the home and foreign
labor services are derived as follows:
` = `¤ =
¾ ¡ 1
¾
» ¡ 1
»·
: (120)
3.2 The short-run equilibrium
In the next subsection, we will examine the e®ects of a negative home cor-
porate tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the macroeconomic variables. In particular,
we will examine the e®ects of this shock by focusing on the degree of LCP.
Before turning to the analysis mentioned above, in this subsection, we ¯rst
take a ¯rst-order approximation for each of Eqs.(105)¡(111) in the neigh-
borhood of the initial steady state and consider the relationships between
various macroeconomic variables. Now, from Eqs.(105) and (106), we obtain
the following equations:
1
2
dnD;t
nD
= ¡d¿t ¡ 1
2
dn¤X;t
n¤X
+
(´ + ´¤)(¸¡ 1)
4
d"t ¡ dqt(zF jD)
¦F (zF jD)
; (121)
1
2
dnX;t
nX
= ¡d¿t ¡ 1
2
dn¤D;t
n¤D
+
(´ + ´¤)(¸¡ 1) + 4
4
d"t ¡ dqt(zF jX)
¦F (zF jX)
: (122)
Eqs.(121) and (122) have the following characteristics. To begin with, a
decrease of ¿t (d¿t < 0) increases after-tax pro¯ts for domestic and export
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¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. Con-
sequently, it encourages new entry into the home market. Next, when the
number of export (domestic) ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of foreign-
located ¯nal goods ¯rms, i.e.,
dn¤X;t
n¤X
³
dn¤D;t
n¤D
´
, increases, the home (foreign)
household's consumption of ¯nal goods produced in the home country de-
creases, which causes a decrease in the sales revenues of domestic (export)
¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, and
thereby decreases after-tax pro¯ts for these domestic (export) ¯rms. Con-
sequently, it leads to exit from the home market. Finally, the e®ects of a
depreciation (d"t > 0) on the number of domestic and export ¯rms in the
tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are positive. We
can explain these results as follows. The depreciation, since it increases the
sales revenues of domestic and export ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of
home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, increases after-tax pro¯ts for these two types
of ¯rms, and hence, the number of these two types of ¯rms increases. In
addition, from the perspective of LCP in both countries, we can show that
these results have the following properties. When the value of ´ and/or ´¤
rises, the increase in the number of domestic and export ¯rms in the tradable
goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms gets steeper. This is because
a rise in ´ and/or ´¤ intensi¯es the increase in after-tax pro¯ts for these two
types of ¯rms through a deterioration in the terms of trade under the trade
in ¯nal goods.19
From a ¯rst-order approximation of Eqs.(108) and (109), we obtain the
following equations:
1
2
dn¤D;t
n¤D
= ¡1
2
dnX;t
nX
¡ (´ + ´
¤)(¸¡ 1)
4
d"t ¡
dq¤t (z
¤
F jD)
¦¤F (z
¤
F jD)
; (123)
1
2
dn¤X;t
n¤X
= ¡1
2
dnD;t
nD
¡ (´ + ´
¤)(¸¡ 1) + 4
4
d"t ¡
dq¤t (z
¤
F jX)
¦¤F (z
¤
F jX)
: (124)
Eqs.(123) and (124) have the following characteristics. To begin with,
the increase in the number of export (domestic) ¯rms in the tradable goods
sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, i.e.,
dnX;t
nX
³
dnD;t
nD
´
, leads to an exit
19We de¯ne the terms of trade under the trade in ¯nal goods as TOTt =
"tp
¤
f;t
ph;t
. Then,
we can represent a ¯rst-order approximation for TOTt as dTOTtTOT =
´+´¤
2 d"t.
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from the foreign market, since the increase in
dnX;t
nX
³
dnD;t
nD
´
decreases the for-
eign (home) household's consumption of ¯nal goods produced in the foreign
country, which causes a decrease in the sales revenues of domestic (export)
¯rms in the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, and
thereby decreases pro¯ts for these domestic (export) ¯rms. Next, the e®ects
of a depreciation (d"t > 0) on the number of domestic and export ¯rms in
the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are negative.
We can explain these results as follows. The depreciation, since it decreases
the sales revenues of domestic and export ¯rms in the tradable goods sec-
tor of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, decreases pro¯ts for these two types
of ¯rms, and hence, the number of these two types of ¯rms decreases. In
addition, from the perspective of LCP in both countries, we can show that
these results have the following properties. When the value of ´ and/or ´¤
rises, the decrease in the number of domestic and export ¯rms in the tradable
goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms gets steeper. This is because
a rise in ´ and/or ´¤ intensi¯es the decrease in pro¯ts for these two types of
¯rms through an improvement in the terms of trade under the trade in ¯nal
goods.
From a ¯rst-order approximation of Eqs.(107) and (110), we obtain the
following equations:
dn¤MN;t
n¤MN
= ¡dqt(zF jMN)
¦F (zF jMN)
¡ d¿t; (125)
dnMN;t
nMN
= ¡dq
¤
t (z
¤
F jMN)
¦¤F (z
¤
F jMN)
: (126)
Eq.(125) has the following characteristics. A decrease of ¿t (d¿t < 0)
increases after-tax pro¯ts for foreign multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable
goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. Consequently, it encourages
new entry into the home market.
From a ¯rst-order approximation of Eq.(111), we obtain the following
equation:µ
1 +
(´ + ´¤)(¸¡ 1)
2
¶
d"t = ¡1
2
µ
dnD;t
nD
¡ dn
¤
X;t
n¤X
¶
+
1
2
µ
dn¤D;t
n¤D
¡ dnX;t
nX
¶
:
(127)
Eq.(127) has the following characteristics. To begin with, an increase in
the relative number of tradable ¯nal goods ¯rms sold in the home country
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³
dnD;t
nD
¡ dn
¤
X;t
n¤X
´
leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. The
balance of payments is restored via the appreciation, since such an increase
leads to an increase in the net export of tradable ¯nal goods. Next, an
increase in the relative number of tradable ¯nal goods ¯rms sold in the for-
eign country
³
dn¤D;t
n¤D
¡ dnX;t
nX
´
leads to a depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. Unlike previous case, the balance of payments is restored via the de-
preciation, since such an increase leads to a decrease in the net export of
tradable ¯nal goods. Here, from Eq.(127), we get
d
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
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¡ dnX;t
nX

d´
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d

@d"t=@

dn¤D;t
n¤
D
¡ dnX;t
nX

d´¤ <
0. This shows that the degrees of appreciation and depreciation, which are
based on the increase in these variables, gets milder.
3.3 The e®ects of corporate tax reduction on macroe-
conomic variables
We now turn to the analysis of the e®ects of corporate tax reduction.
3.3.1 E®ect on the nominal exchange rate
In this subsubsection, we examine the e®ect of a negative home corporate
tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the nominal exchange rate. To begin with, from
Eqs.(121) and (124), we derive:
dnD;t
d¿t
1
nD
¡ dn
¤
X;t
d¿t
1
n¤X
= ¡1
°
+
¸(´ + ´¤)
2°
d"t
d¿t
: (128)
Next, from Eqs.(122) and (123), we derive:
dn¤D;t
d¿t
1
n¤D
¡ dnX;t
d¿t
1
nX
=
1
°
¡ ¸(´ + ´
¤)
2°
d"t
d¿t
: (129)
Therefore, from Eqs.(127)¡(129), we derive:
d"t
d¿t
=
2
¢
> 0; (130)
where ¢ ´ °f(´+ ´¤)(¸¡ 1) + 2g+ ¸(´+ ´¤) > 0. Eq.(130) shows that this
shock unambiguously leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
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Eq.(130) also shows that the degree of appreciation decreases in response to
the rise in ´ and/or ´¤. This can be explained as follows. To begin with,
from Eqs.(128) and (129), when the value of ´ and/or ´¤ rises, the relative
number of tradable ¯nal goods ¯rms sold in the home country decreases, and
the relative number of tradable ¯nal goods ¯rms sold in the foreign country
increases. These things reduce the degree of trade surplus. In addition,
when the value of ´ and/or ´¤, which is the component of coe±cient of d"t
in Eq.(127), rises, the degree of trade surplus also decreases. Consequently,
from these two perspectives, the degree of appreciation, which is required to
correct the resulting trade surplus, decreases.
3.3.2 E®ects on the number of ¯nal goods ¯rms
In this subsubsection, we examine the e®ects of a negative home corporate
tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the number of various ¯nal goods ¯rms. To begin
with, from Eqs.(121)¡(124) and (130), the number of domestic and export
¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are as
follows:
dnD;t
d¿t
1
nD
= ¡ 1
2°(1 + °)
µ
(1 + 2°) +
°(2 + ´ ¡ ´¤)¡ ¸(´ + ´¤)(1 + °)
¢
¶
< 0;
(131)
dnX;t
d¿t
1
nX
= ¡ 1
2°(1 + °)
µ
(1 + 2°)¡ °(2 + ´
¤ ¡ ´) + ¸(´ + ´¤)(1 + °)
¢
¶
< 0:
(132)
Eqs.(131) and (132) show that the e®ects of this shock on the number
of domestic and export ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located
¯nal goods ¯rms are positive. These results can be explained intuitively as
follows. When this shock occurs, the after-tax pro¯ts for these two types of
¯rms increase. At the same time, it causes a decrease in entry costs for these
two types of ¯rms. Consequently, the number of these two types of ¯rms
increases, since it causes an increase in di®erence between after-tax pro¯ts
and entry costs for each of these ¯rms (see Eqs.(121), (122) and (130)).
Here, di®erentiating Eq.(131) with respect to ´ and ´¤, we can show that
the rise in ´ and/or ´¤ weakens the increase in the number of domestic ¯rms
in the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. This can
be explained as follows. The larger the value of ´ and/or ´¤, the lower the
degree of the increase in di®erence between after-tax pro¯ts and entry costs
for domestic ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods
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¯rms (see the right hand side of Eq.(121)). This weakens the degree of entry
for these domestic ¯rms. Consequently, the degree of the increase in the
number of these domestic ¯rms weakens. On the other hand, di®erentiating
Eq.(132) with respect to ´ and ´¤, we can show that the rise in ´ basically
intensi¯es the increase in the number of export ¯rms in the tradable goods
sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, while the rise in ´¤ weakens the
increase in the number of these export ¯rms. In particular, the former result
can be explained based on the fact that the increase in di®erence between
after-tax pro¯ts and entry costs for these export ¯rms basically intensi¯es
(see the right hand side of Eq.(122)).
Next, from Eqs.(121)¡(124) and (130), the number of domestic and export
¯rms in the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are as
follows:
dn¤D;t
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1
n¤D
=
1
2°(1 + °)
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Eq.(133) shows that the e®ect of this shock on the number of domestic
¯rms in the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms is neg-
ative, while Eq.(134) shows that the e®ect of this shock on the number of
export ¯rms in the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms
is positive. These results can be explained intuitively as follows. When this
shock occurs, it brings more entry costs than pro¯ts for the former ¯rms, but
it brings more pro¯ts than entry costs for the latter ¯rms. Consequently, the
number of the former ¯rms decreases and that of the latter ¯rms increases.
Here, di®erentiating Eq.(133) with respect to ´ and ´¤, we can show that the
rise in ´ and/or ´¤ weakens the decrease in the number of domestic ¯rms in
the tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. On the other
hand, di®erentiating Eq.(134) with respect to ´ and ´¤, we can show that
the rise in ´ intensi¯es the increase in the number of export ¯rms in the
tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, while the rise in
´¤ basically weakens the increase in the number of these export ¯rms. The
logic of these mechanisms can also be explained by using that adopted for
the result obtained from Eq.(132).
Finally, from Eqs.(125), (126) and (130), the number of foreign multi-
national ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods
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¯rms, and that of home multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector
of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms are as follows:
dn¤MN;t
d¿t
1
n¤MN
= ¡ 1
1 + °
Ã
1¡ ´¤
¢
+ 1
!
< 0; (135)
dnMN;t
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1
nMN
=
1
1 + °
1¡ ´
¢
¸ 0: (136)
Eq.(135) shows that the e®ect of this shock on the number of foreign
multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal
goods ¯rms is positive, while Eq.(136) shows that the e®ect of this shock
on the number of home multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector
of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms is non-positive. The reason why these
results are obtained is that while this shock causes both an increase in after-
tax pro¯ts and a decrease in entry costs for the former ¯rms, in the foreign
country it prevents the entry costs for the latter ¯rms from decreasing (see
Eqs.(125), (126) and (130)). Here, di®erentiating both Eqs.(135) and (136)
with respect to ´ and ´¤, we can show that the rise in ´ and/or ´¤ basically
weakens both the increase in the number of foreign multinational ¯rms in the
non-tradable goods sector of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms and the decrease
in the number of home multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector
of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. In particular, the latter result can be
explained as follows. The larger the value of ´ and/or ´¤, the lower the degree
of the increase in entry costs for home multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable
goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. This weakens the degree of
exit of these multinational ¯rms. Consequently, the degree of the decrease
in the number of these multinational ¯rms weakens.
3.3.3 E®ects on CPI and overall consumption
In this subsubsection, we examine the e®ects of a negative home corporate
tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the CPIs of both the countries and overall consump-
tions in both countries. To begin with, we consider the e®ects of this shock
on the CPIs of both the countries. The e®ects of this shock on the CPIs of
both the countries are as follows:
dPt
d¿t
1
P
=
1
2(¸¡ 1)(1 + °)
Ã
2¡±+f1 + (1 + °)(¸¡ 1)gf2(1¡ ´
¤) + ±(´ + ´¤)g
¢
!
> 0;
(137)
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(138)
Eq.(137) shows that the e®ect of this shock on home CPI is negative, while
Eq.(138) shows that the e®ect of this shock on foreign CPI is ambiguous.
Using the variables that represent the number of various ¯nal goods ¯rms
and the nominal exchange rate, Eqs.(137) and (138) can be rewritten as
follows:
dPt
d¿t
1
P
= ¡ 1
¸¡ 1
Ã
±
2
µ
dnD;t
d¿t
1
nD
+
dn¤X;t
d¿t
1
n¤X
¶
+ (1¡ ±)dn
¤
MN;t
d¿t
1
n¤MN
¡(¸¡ 1)f2(1¡ ´
¤) + ±(´ + ´¤)g
4
d"t
d¿t
!
> 0 (139)
dP ¤t
d¿t
1
P ¤
= ¡ 1
¸¡ 1
Ã
±
2
µ
dn¤D;t
d¿t
1
n¤D
+
dnX;t
d¿t
1
nX
¶
+ (1¡ ±)dnMN;t
d¿t
1
nMN
+
(¸¡ 1)f2(1¡ ´) + ±(´ + ´¤)g
4
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As shown in Eq.(139), the e®ect of this shock on home CPI can be sep-
arated into two channels: the weighted sum of the number of three types of
¯nal goods ¯rms that sell in the home market, and the nominal exchange
rate. Both of these channels are negative.20 Therefore, the overall e®ect
of this shock on home CPI is negative. This is determined independently
of home and foreign LCP parameters. Similarly, as shown in Eq.(140), the
e®ect of this shock on foreign CPI can be also separated into two channels:
20More precisely, we can explain the mechanisms of these two channels as follows. To
begin with, the mechanism of the former channel can be explained as follows. When a
negative home corporate tax shock occurs (d¿t < 0), the e®ect on the weighted sum of the
number of three types of ¯nal goods ¯rms that sell in the home market is positive, which
causes a decline in the weighted sum of the home-currency prices of ¯nal goods produced
by these ¯rms through the increase in the supply of ¯nal goods sold in the home country.
Consequently, the e®ect of this channel on home CPI is negative. Next, the mechanism
of the latter channel can be explained as follows. When such a shock occurs, the nominal
exchange rate appreciates, which cause a decline in the weighted sum of the home-currency
prices of ¯nal goods sold in the home country. Consequently, the e®ect of this channel on
home CPI is also negative.
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the weighted sum of the number of three types of ¯nal goods ¯rms that sell
in the foreign market, and the nominal exchange rate. Unlike in the case of
the home country, the former channel is ambiguous, but the latter channel
is positive. Therefore, the overall e®ect of this shock on foreign CPI is am-
biguous. Here, the rise in ´¤ weakens the decrease in home CPI, and the rise
in ´ weakens the increase in (or intensi¯es the decrease in) foreign CPI. In
particular, the former result can be explained by the decline in the degree of
the decrease in the two channels due to the rise in ´¤.
Next, we consider the e®ects of a negative home corporate tax shock
(d¿t < 0) on overall home consumption Ct(´ 1=Pt) and overall foreign con-
sumption C¤t (´ 1=P ¤t ). The e®ect of this shock on Ct is positive, since the
e®ect of this shock on home CPI is always negative. Here, from the de¯nition
of Ct, when the decrease in home CPI weakens, the increase in Ct weakens.
On the other hand, the e®ect of this shock on C¤t is ambiguous, since the
e®ect of this shock on foreign CPI is ambiguous. Here, from the de¯nition of
C¤t , when the increase (or decrease) in foreign CPI weakens (or intensi¯es),
the decrease (or increase) in C¤t weakens (or intensi¯es).
3.3.4 E®ects on employment
In this subsubsection, we examine the e®ects of a negative home corporate
tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the employment levels of both countries. Here, the
e®ects of this shock on the employment levels of both countries are as follows:
d`t
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Eq.(141) shows that the e®ect of this shock on home employment is am-
biguous, while Eq.(142) shows that the e®ect of this shock on foreign employ-
ment is positive. Using the variables that represent the number of various
¯nal goods ¯rms and the nominal exchange rate, Eqs.(141) and (142) can be
rewritten as follows:
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As shown in Eqs.(143) and (144), the e®ects of this shock on the em-
ployment levels of both countries can be separated into two channels: the
weighted sum of the number of three types of ¯nal goods ¯rms located in
both countries, and the nominal exchange rate. Although the e®ect of the
¯rst channel on home employment is the same as that on foreign employ-
ment, the e®ect of the second channel on home employment is di®erent from
that on foreign employment. The di®erence between the second channel in
Eq.(143) and that in Eq.(144) plays a critical role in the e®ects of this shock
on the employment levels of both countries. Therefore, the overall e®ect of
this shock on foreign employment is positive, since the e®ect of the second
channel in Eq.(144) is positive.21 This is determined independently of home
and foreign LCP parameters. Here, the rise in ´ weakens the decrease in (or
21More precisely, the e®ect of a negative home corporate tax shock (d¿t < 0) on foreign
employment is shown by the e®ects through two macroeconomic variables of Y ¤f;t, which
is a composite of the foreign intermediate inputs used by foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms,
and Yf;t, which is a composite of the foreign intermediate inputs used by home-located
¯nal goods ¯rms. The e®ect of this shock on Y ¤f;t is shown by the following three channels:
the weighted sum of the number of three types of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, the
weighted sum of the pro¯ts earned by the three types of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms,
and the nominal exchange rate. To begin with, when this shock occurs, the weighted sum
of the number of three types of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms basically decreases, which
basically causes the decrease in the supply of foreign ¯nal goods. This basically weakens
the foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms' demand for a composite of the inputs produced by
domestic ¯rms in the foreign intermediate goods sector. Consequently, the e®ect of this
channel on Y ¤f;t is basically negative. Next, when this shock occurs, the weighted sum of the
pro¯ts earned by three types of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms basically increases, which
basically causes an increase in the supply of foreign ¯nal goods. This basically intensi¯es
the foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms' demands for a composite of the inputs produced
by domestic ¯rms in the foreign intermediate goods sector. Consequently, the e®ect of
this channel on Y ¤f;t is basically positive. Finally, when this shock occurs, the nominal
exchange rate appreciates. Under circumstances other than ´ = 1, this bumps the foreign-
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intensi¯es the increase in) home employment and the rise in ´¤ weakens the
increase in foreign employment. In particular, the latter result can mainly be
explained by the decline in the degree of the increase in the second channel
due to the rise in ´¤.
3.3.5 E®ects on aggregate output
In this subsubsection, we examine the e®ects of a negative home corporate
tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the aggregate output in both countries. Here, the
e®ects of this shock on the aggregate output in both countries are as follows:
dYt
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Eq.(145) shows that the e®ect of this shock on aggregate home output is
non-negative, while Eq.(146) shows that the e®ect of this shock on aggregate
foreign output is non-positive. Using the variables that represent the numbers
of various ¯nal goods ¯rms, Eqs.(145) and (146) can be rewritten as follows:
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currency price that corresponds to a composite of the inputs produced by export ¯rms
in the home intermediate goods sector, which causes a decrease in the foreign-located
¯nal goods ¯rms' demands for a composite of the inputs produced by export ¯rms in the
home intermediate goods sector. The decrease in this demand leads to the decrease in
the foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms' outputs, and hence, the foreign-located ¯nal goods
¯rms' demand for a composite of the inputs produced by domestic ¯rms in the foreign
intermediate goods sector declines. Consequently, the e®ect of this channel on Y ¤f;t is
negative under such circumstances. Except for the direct e®ect of this shock, the e®ect of
this shock on Yf;t can be also shown by the following three channels: the weighted sum
of the number of three types of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, the weighted sum of the
pro¯ts earned by three types of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, and the nominal exchange
rate. Unlike in the case of Y ¤f;t, the e®ect of an appreciation on Yf;t is positive under
circumstances other than ´¤ = 1. This can be explained as follows. When the nominal
exchange rate appreciates, the home-currency price that corresponds to a composite of the
inputs produced by export ¯rms in the foreign intermediate goods sector declines. This
causes an increase in the home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms' demand for a composite of the
inputs produced by export ¯rms in the foreign intermediate goods sector. Consequently,
the e®ect of this channel on Yf;t is positive under such circumstances.
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As shown in Eq.(147), the e®ect of this shock on the weighted sum of the
number of three types of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms is positive. There-
fore, there is a potential for an increase in aggregate home output. On the
other hand, as shown in Eq.(148), the e®ect of this shock on the weighted
sum of the number of three types of foreign-located ¯nal goods ¯rms is non-
positive. Therefore, there is a potential for a decrease in aggregate foreign
output (with regard to a part of the mechanisms of these results, refer to
the content in footnote 21). Here, the rise in ´ and/or ´¤ basically weakens
the increase in aggregate home output and the decrease in aggregate foreign
output. These results can be explained by the °uctuations of the numbers
of various ¯nal goods ¯rms due to the rise in ´ and/or ´¤. For example, the
rise in ´¤ weakens the increase in the number of each of the three types of
home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms. Therefore, the rise in this value basically
weakens the increase in aggregate home output.
4 Welfare
In this section, we examine the e®ects of a reduction in the corporate
tax rate of the home country on the welfare of both countries. Following
Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, 1996) and others, we focus on the real parts of
a household's utility and assume that the e®ect of real balances on utility is
small enough to be neglected.22 By taking the ¯rst-order approximation of
the household's utility under such an assumption, we examine the e®ects of
such a reduction on the welfare of both countries. As with the analysis of
the e®ects of this reduction on the macroeconomic variables, we examine its
e®ects by focusing on the degree of LCP. However, it is di±cult to evaluate
fully its e®ects from the perspective of analytical investigation. Therefore, we
examine its e®ects numerically. To perform analyses based on the numerical
example, we need to specify the values of ¯ve parameters. To begin with, we
22By abstracting from the utility of real balances, we follow the formulation of Obstfeld
and Rogo® (1995, 1996). Many literatures of NOEM model use this formulation; see, e.g.,
Betts and Devereux (2000), Corsetti et al. (2000), Obstfeld and Rogo® (2000, 2002), Tille
(2001), Sutherland (2004), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Berger (2006), Shi and Xu (2007),
and Dohwa (2008, 2014, 2018).
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set the elasticity of substitution between any two di®erentiated ¯nal goods
at ¸ = 10, since ¯nal goods tend to be highly substitutable, and thus the
elasticity among them tends to be high. On the other hand, we set the
elasticity of substitution between any two di®erentiated intermediate inputs
at ¾ = 3, since intermediate inputs tend to be highly di®erentiated, and thus
the elasticity among them tends to be low. The values of these elasticities
are basically based on the idea of Shioji (2006). Next, following Erceg et al.
(2000), we set the elasticity of substitution among labor varieties at » = 6.
Finally, we set ° and ± somewhat arbitrarily at 1 and 0.5, respectively. In
what follows, we describe the closed form solutions that show the e®ects
of this reduction on the welfare of both countries. After introducing some
speculation from the perspective of analytical investigation, we show the
numerical example described above.
4.1 Analytical investigation
The e®ects of a negative home corporate tax shock (d¿t < 0) on the welfare
of both countries are as follows:
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1
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From Eqs.(149) and (150), the e®ects of this shock on the welfare of
both countries are basically ambiguous. Therefore, we consider under what
circumstances this shock raises or does not raise the levels of home and foreign
welfare. To begin with, it follows from Eqs.(137), (141) and (149) that this
shock raises home welfare as long as ´ and ´¤ meet the following condition:
[(2¸¡ 1)© + (©¡ 2¸¾») ­] ´ < (1¡­)©´¤+[¸¾» f­ + °(2¡ ±)g ¡ (1 + ° ¡ ¸)©] ;
(151)
where ­ ´ °(¸¡ 1) + ¸ > 0 and © ´ (¾ ¡ 1)(» ¡ 1)(¸¡ 1)(1 + °) > 0.
On the other hand, when ´ and ´¤ satisfy the following condition, this
shock lowers home welfare:
[(2¸¡ 1)© + (©¡ 2¸¾») ­] ´ > (1¡­)©´¤+[¸¾» f­ + °(2¡ ±)g ¡ (1 + ° ¡ ¸)©] :
(152)
39
The condition (151) shows that this shock causes the positive e®ect on
welfare from the consumption of ¯nal goods to dominate the negative e®ect
on welfare from employment. On the other hand, the condition (152) shows
that this shock causes the negative e®ect on welfare from employment to
dominate the positive e®ect on welfare from the consumption of ¯nal goods.
Next, from Eqs.(138), (142) and (150), this shock raises foreign welfare
when ´ and ´¤ satisfy the following condition:
[(1 + ­)©¡ 2¸¾»­] ´ < (2¸¡ 1¡ ­)©´¤ + 2 [¸¾»(°± ¡ ­) + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)©] :
(153)
On the other hand, when ´ and ´¤ satisfy the following condition, this
shock lowers foreign welfare:
[(1 + ­)©¡ 2¸¾»­] ´ > (2¸¡ 1¡ ­)©´¤ + 2 [¸¾»(°± ¡ ­) + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)©] :
(154)
The condition (153) shows that this shock causes the positive e®ect on wel-
fare from the consumption of ¯nal goods to dominate the negative e®ect on
welfare from employment. On the other hand, the condition (154) shows that
this shock causes the negative e®ect on welfare from employment to dominate
the positive e®ect on welfare from the consumption of ¯nal goods. Under the
condition (154), this shock can be regarded as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy
in the sense that it lowers foreign welfare.
4.2 Numerical example
[Insert Table 1]
In this subsection, we examine the e®ects of a negative home corporate
tax shock (d¿t < 0) from the perspective of a numerical example. Before
examining the e®ects of this shock on the welfare of both countries, we ex-
amine the e®ects of this shock on the overall consumptions of both countries
(Ct and C
¤
t ) and the employment levels of both countries (`t and `
¤
t ). These
analyses adopt scenario (a) in Table 1 as the benchmark scenario. To begin
with, the ¯rst and second lines of Table 1 show the e®ect of this shock on
Ct and C
¤
t , respectively. In all scenarios in Table 1, the e®ect of this shock
on Ct is positive. On the other hand, in scenarios other than scenarios (b)
and (d) in Table 1, the e®ect of this shock on C¤t is negative. In scenario (a)
in Table 1, the positive e®ect on Ct is largest. One of the reasons why this
result is obtained is that all of the intermediate goods ¯rms employ PCP.
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When the degree of LCP rises, this e®ect is signi¯cantly weakened compared
with the benchmark scenario. Next, the third and fourth lines of Table 1
show the e®ect of this shock on `t and `
¤
t , respectively. In scenarios other
than scenario (a) in Table 1, the e®ect of this shock on `t is positive. On
the other hand, in all scenarios in Table 1, the e®ect of this shock on `¤t is
positive. In scenario (a) in Table 1, the e®ect of this shock on `¤t is largest.
One of the reasons why this result is obtained is that all of the intermediate
goods ¯rms employ PCP. When the degree of LCP rises, the positive e®ect
on `¤t is signi¯cantly weakened compared with the benchmark scenario.
We now examine the e®ects of a negative home corporate tax shock on the
welfare of both countries. The ¯fth and sixth lines of Table 1 show the e®ect
of this shock on the home country's utility and that on the foreign country's
utility, respectively. In all scenarios in Table 1, the e®ect of this shock on the
home country's utility is positive, but that on the foreign country's utility
is negative. Therefore, all scenarios in Table 1 show that this shock has a
prosper-thyself and beggar-thy-neighbor e®ect. This can be explained based
on the results that ´ and ´¤ satisfy the conditions (151) and (154). In addi-
tion, compared with the benchmark scenario, the e®ect of this shock on the
home country's utility weakens in scenarios (b)¡(d) in Table 1, but that on
the foreign country's utility strengthens in the same scenarios.
5 Conclusions
By incorporating the three factors of LCP, vertical production and trade,
and endogenous entry by ¯nal goods ¯rms into the standard NOEM model
with nominal wage and price rigidities, this paper has examined how a nega-
tive home corporate tax shock a®ects the macroeconomic variables and wel-
fare. The main ¯ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. First,
we show that a rise in the degree of LCP weakens the appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate caused by this shock. Second, we show that a rise
in the degree of LCP magni¯es the e®ect of this shock on the number of
¯nal goods ¯rms located in the home and foreign countries. In particular, we
show that a rise in the degree of LCP basically weakens both the increase in
the number of foreign multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector
of home-located ¯nal goods ¯rms, and the decrease in the number of home
multinational ¯rms in the non-tradable goods sector of foreign-located ¯nal
goods ¯rms. Third, the e®ect of this shock on aggregate home output is ba-
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sically positive, while that on aggregate foreign output is basically negative.
When the degree of LCP rises, these e®ects are basically weakened compared
with the scenario of full PCP. Finally, the e®ect of this shock on home wel-
fare is positive, while that on foreign welfare is negative. When the degree
of LCP rises, these e®ects are also weakened compared with the scenario of
full PCP.
The above four ¯ndings illustrate that a change in the degree of ¯rms'
price-setting behavior a®ects the e®ects of a reduction in home corporate
tax rate. Hence, the government should take into account this factor when
making decisions. If the aim of a reduction in home corporate tax rate is to
strengthen the exit of home multinational ¯rms, the entry of foreign multi-
national ¯rms, the increase in aggregate home output, and the improvement
in home welfare, the home government should aggressively conduct such a
tax reduction when the degree of this factor is small.
In this paper, we obtained the above ¯ndings by making some strong as-
sumptions. It would be more desirable to ¯nd the various results by relaxing
these assumptions. First, this paper may yield results that are more inter-
esting if the current model is modi¯ed to include \third country currency" as
in Shioji (2006), Dohwa (2008), and Goldberg and Tille (2009). Second, this
paper may also yield results that are more interesting if we extend the current
model to a model allowing households to borrow and lend on international
markets. These issues remain for future research.
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Table 1: The e®ects of a negative home corporate tax shock.
(a) ´ = ´¤ = 0 (b) ´ = 1, ´¤ = 0 (c) ´ = 0, ´¤ = 1 (d) ´ = ´¤ = 1
dCt
d¿t
1
C
0.569 0.104 0.054 0.055
dC¤t
d¿t
1
C¤ ¡0.514 0.001 ¡0.049 0.001
d`t
d¿t
1
`
¡0.4 0.052 0.005 0.05
d`¤t
d¿t
1
`¤ 0.5 0.095 0.048 0.05
dUt
d¿t
0.792 0.075 0.052 0.027
dU¤t
d¿t
¡0.792 ¡0.052 ¡0.075 ¡0.027
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